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Today, we see a growing concern for the quality of life of nonhuman animals and an accompanying call for viable
means of assessing how well animals thrive. Past research focused on minimizing negatives such as stress, while
more recent endeavors strive to promote positives such as happiness. But what is animal happiness? Although often
mentioned, the term lacks a clear definition. With recent advances in the study of animal emotion, current interest
into positive rather than negative experiences, and the call for captive and domesticated animals to have good lives,
the time is ripe to examine the concept of animal happiness. We draw from the human and animal literature to
delineate a concept of animal happiness and propose how to assess it. We argue that animal happiness depends on
how an individual feels generally—that is, a typical level of affect.
Keywords: animal welfare; human happiness; typical level of affect; affect balance
Introduction
There is increasing public concern for the treat-
ment of captive and domesticated animals, includ-
ing laboratory, farm, work, zoo, companion, and
managed wild animals. Western societies now call
for “a good life” for these animals.1–3 A concern
for animal welfare is based on the acceptance of
animal sentience, which is defined as the capacity
to feel pain and pleasure. The traditional approach
to animal welfare was that pain, suffering, distress,
and other negative physical or mental experiences
should be minimized.4 Consequently, there is a bias
in the science of animal welfare toward the study
of negative experiences at the expense of positive
ones.5 Advances in our understanding of animals,
in particular mammals, and the associated evolution
in societal views have led to the gradual inclusion
of positive experiences into definitions and assess-
ments of animal welfare.4,6,7 It is now evident that
although the study of negative experiences may have
more moral urgency, simply aiming at an absence
of negative experiences cannot translate into a good
life.3,6
The increased focus on the positive has been par-
alleled by an increased interest in the emotional lives,
or affective states, of animals, from a conceptual
and practical point of view.8–10 As with definitions
of animal welfare, definitions of affect, whether in
relation to animals or humans, are diverse. It is
generally agreed that affect is a subjective experi-
ence that varies in pleasantness or unpleasantness
(valence) as well as activation (arousal).11 In line
with an increased interest in animal affect, a grow-
ing body of methodologies to assess affect in animals
are being proposed.12 These methodologies involve
the measurement of physiological, behavioral, or
cognitive variables thought to vary with, or be an
inherent part of, affective experiences.9
Questions
With a growing interest in promoting positive
experiences and the call for a good life, the concept
of animal happiness requires exploration. Although
a number of articles addressing animal welfare men-
tion the term animal happiness, this term is either
not defined3,13–17 or defined inconsistently, with
authors sometimes referring to a personality trait,6
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Box 1: Happiness and philosophy
Throughout the ages, philosophers have contemplated the definition of a good life. Aristotle (384–322 BC)
developed a theory of happiness (eudaimonia) that focused on fulfilling an ideal human life and living life
according to the virtues.20 Epicurus (341–270 BC) reasoned that happiness was to be in a state of ataraxia,
which means to be untroubled by worries or to be content.21 Most premodern thinkers do not attribute the
concept of happiness to animals. This was not necessarily because they did not attribute positive affective
experiences to animals but because they were concerned with the concept of happiness as a phenomenon
connected to higher cognitive abilities such as abstract reasoning, seeing the meaning in one’s life and assessing
one’s situation across past and future; abilities that we do not readily attribute to animals. By the 18th century,
such diverse thinkers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham had started including animals into their
normative theories due to animals’ presumed ability to experience pain and pleasure.22,23
a short-term emotion or a longer term mood,6,8,12
or providing a vague definition.6 Yet others equate
happiness with quality of life and apply a defini-
tion similar to that found in the human literature.18
Given the inconsistent use of the term happiness in
the context of animal welfare, the time is ripe to con-
sider the concept of animal happiness and answer
the following key questions: What exactly is ani-
mal happiness? How does animal happiness relate
to animal welfare? and How can we assess animal
happiness?
Approach
The study of human welfare, or quality of life, has
benefited from many more years of thought and
study, and from the human capacity to report sub-
jective feelings verbally. Human psychology research
provides animal researchers with new insights into
potential definitions and methods.19 The aim of our
review is to propose a framework for the concept
and assessment of animal happiness. To this end, we
first study the literature on human quality of life, in
particular, human happiness, and identify concepts
that may also apply to animals and compare these
with notions of animal welfare. Following this, pos-
sible methodologies to assess the proposed concept
of animal happiness are examined.
Human happiness
The concept of human happiness has been examined
for millennia by philosophers (Box 1), and for just
over a century by psychologists. In humans, hap-
piness has been related to quality of life, including
satisfaction with life and well-being, and the mean-
ings of these terms must hence be briefly presented
before we examine the concept of human happiness.
Four different notions of human quality of life
There are many notions, or views, of human qual-
ity of life and these can be sorted into a fourfold
matrix24 (Fig. 1): (1) livability of the environment,
(2) life-ability of the individual, (3) usefulness of
life, and (4) satisfaction with life. This matrix draws
on two distinctions. The first distinction is between
the chances for a good life and the actual outcomes
of a life, with chances and outcomes being related
but not the same; individuals may fail to realize
chances, but they may also make much out of poor
chances. The second difference is between external
(in the environment) and internal (in the individ-
ual) qualities. External and internal qualities refer
to conditions of which an individual need not be
aware of subjectively to have a high quality of life.
Liveability of the environment represents the view
that human quality of life has to do with the quality
of living conditions. This view refers explicitly to
a characteristic of the environment and does not
have the limited connotation of material conditions.
Figure 1. The four different views of human quality of life,
based on Veenhoven.24 The matrix draws a distinction between
chances for a good life and the outcomes of a life, and between
external (environmental) and internal (individual) qualities.
A distinction is also made between cognitive and affective
appraisals linked to the satisfaction with life quadrant.
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One could also speak of the “habitability” of an
environment. Contemporary economists often refer
to this as “welfare” or “standard of living.”25,26
Life-ability of the individual represents the view
that human quality of life has to do with how well
individuals are equipped to cope with challenges.
Doctors and psychologists use the terms quality of
life and well-being to denote this specific meaning.27
In biology, the phenomenon is referred to as
adaptive potential28 and in health care as health.29
Psychological terms include efficacy and potency.30
Life-ability will typically add to a subjective appre-
ciation of life (bottom-right quadrant), but should
not be equated with that. Even the best life-abilities
can fail to overcome severe environmental chal-
lenges, and the benefits of specific life-abilities
depend on which environment one lives in.
Usefulness of life represents the view that human
quality of life has to do with higher values. In other
words, a good life is one that is good for some-
thing other than itself, it should have a meaning and
purpose, such as a commitment to socially shared
values. It is sometimes referred to as “the mean-
ing of life,” which then is intended to denote true
(objective) significance, instead of a mere subjective
sense of meaning.31 Note that this external benefit
does not require inner awareness. A human’s life
may be useful without them knowing, especially
if the effects manifest after their death. A useful
life is not necessarily a happy life, for instance, not
when one sacrifices one’s personal happiness for a
greater good.32 Only aspects of usefulness for which
an individual is aware may impact on the subjective
appreciation of life (bottom-right quadrant).
Satisfaction with life represents the view that
human quality of life is in the eye of the beholder and
designates “subjective appreciation of one’s life as a
whole.” This is commonly referred to using terms
such as subjective well-being,33 life satisfaction,34
and happiness35 in a limited sense of this word.
Much of the present day happiness research focuses
on this human quality of life, and human happiness
can hence be defined as the enjoyment of one’s life
as a whole. A life will have more of this quality, the
more and the longer a life is enjoyed. The four views
of the human quality of life described above are
causally interrelated. Chances for a good life affect
outcomes of life, but inversely outcomes can also
affect changes; satisfaction with life (outcome) can
foster life-abilities such as resilience (chances).
Assumed and apparent quality of life
The term quality of life includes four separate
notions. The first three of these notions are the
assumed quality of life, while the last one, hap-
piness (also referred to as satisfaction with life),
is the apparent quality of life. Most research on
human quality of life aims at identifying optimal
life-chances, that is, environmental conditions that
policies should provide, and inner capabilities that
education should cultivate (upper two quadrants
in Fig. 1). Yet, it is easier to count the presence
of such conditions than to ascertain that they are
really required for a good life, and if relevant, to
what degree, in what combinations, and for what
kinds of people. Hence, notions of livability and
life-ability depend heavily on values and, for that
reason, common sum-scores of life-chances reflect
assumed quality of life.36 Whether such combina-
tions actually result in a good life is determined
by how long and happy people live, which Veen-
hoven calls apparent quality of life.36 In his view, we
can identify good life-chances (top two quadrants
in Fig. 1) by studying happiness levels in different
cases (right bottom quadrant).
Two components of human happiness
Happiness was defined above as the enjoyment of
one’s life as a whole. When appraising how happy
they are, humans draw upon two sources of infor-
mation: (1) how well their life-as-it-is compares
to standards of how they believe life should be
(conscious demands) and (2) how well they feel
in general. These subappraisals are seen as com-
ponents of happiness; the cognitive component and
the affective component, respectively.37–40 Although
the cognitive and affective components of happiness
represent different mechanisms, they are found to
strongly correlate.34
Cognitive component. Bentham22 thought of
happiness as the end product of a mental calculus.
Many scholars in the field also see it as the result of
a cognitive process—a weighted average of earlier
life-aspect evaluations41 or a series of comparisons
of life-as-it-is with various standards of how-life-
should-be.42 The cognitive component of happiness
requires conscious awareness: Do I get what I want
from life? Veenhoven refers to the cognitive
component of happiness as “contentment,” in
essence, the “degree to which an individual
perceives that his or her aspirations are met.”43
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Note that this component of happiness has no
connection to the cognitive component of affect,
which has to do with the bidirectional link between
affect, on the one hand, and judgment, attention,
and memory, on the other hand.44
Affective component. Individuals who experi-
ence positive affect frequently and negative affect
infrequently report high levels of happiness.40 This
affective component of happiness includes both
positive and negative affect, which are thought to be
regulated by separate dedicated systems.32,45,46 Pos-
itive affect is thought to be regulated by the behav-
ioral activation system, which promotes approach,
while negative affect is thought to be regulated by
the behavioral inhibition system, which promotes
avoidance.45 Evolutionary biologists propose that
individuals receive a positive affective signal for
events that help them thrive and adapt to the envi-
ronment and a negative affective signal for events
that compromise survival or reproductive success.47
As Spruijt et al.48 state, “Under normal condi-
tions those things that are pleasurable, i.e. causing
and reinforcing behavior at this moment, are those
things that are good in the long run, i.e. have high
fitness value.” This implies that under nonnatural
conditions, such as those linked to modern living,
pleasurable things may, in fact, lead to low fitness
in the long run. This low fitness may, in turn, be
linked to a high frequency of negative experiences,
for example, those linked to being overweight, tired
or ill from eating high-fat and high-sugar foods,
which will subsequently lead to low levels of affec-
tive happiness.
It is the frequency, not the intensity, of affect that
seems to have the highest weight in overall reports of
happiness:40 humans reporting high levels of happi-
ness do not experience more intense positive emo-
tions, but rather more frequent positive emotions
of average intensity.49 Therefore, affective happi-
ness, although sometimes referred to as the average
level of affect, is based on the frequency of positive
and negative affect (separately or the ratio thereof)
and not per se on an average, which would imply
that the intensity/value of each transient emotion
or mood is of importance. Moreover, the affective
component of happiness does not require conscious
awareness.50 One can feel well most of the time with-
out being aware of one’s typical level of affect. In
essence, affective happiness is a background typical
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the distinction between
emotion, mood, and affective happiness. Although emotions
and moods are transient affective experiences, affective happi-
ness is stable under more or less stable conditions.
level of affect that one may only become aware of
when one needs to report it.
Affective happiness cannot be equated with emo-
tions and moods. Moods are generally defined as
affective states that are derived from the cumulative
experience of shorter term (acute) emotions, which
occur in response to specific external or internal
stimuli.8 Moods are transient states and are gener-
ally said to last hours to weeks.51 Affective happiness,
that is, hedonic or typical level of affect, draws on
affective experiences, such as emotions and moods,
but is not the same. Affective happiness is not an
emotion or a mood but the frequency of pleasant-
ness in all affective experiences. All affective states
are transitory, but the frequency of positive and neg-
ative affect, that is affective happiness, can be quite
stable (Fig. 2). Since affective happiness is defined
as how well one feels most of the time, it has some
stability by definition. This is not to say that affective
happiness is a fixed trait; how well one feels on the
balance is basically a state though typically repro-
duced in stable conditions. In livable conditions, we
tend to feel well, that is, experience more positive
than negative affect, studies in contemporary afflu-
ent societies showing ratios of around 3 to 1.52
There are good reasons to believe that overall hap-
piness is mainly extrapolated from affective rather
than cognitive experience.34 One reason for this is
that “life-as-a-whole is not a suitable object for cal-
culative evaluation.”53 Life has many facets and there
is generally no straightforward ideal to compare it
with. Another reason seems to be that cognitive
appraisals are often instigated by affective cues.54
This corresponds with the theory that affective sys-
tems are evolutionarily older than cognition and
that cognition works as an addition to the naviga-
tion system rather than as a replacement.55
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Notions of animal welfare and links to
human quality of life and happiness
Notions of animal welfare
In modern animal welfare research, three main
views of animal welfare have been identified by
Fraser: (1) basic health and functioning, (2) nat-
ural living, and (3) affective states.13,14
The basic health and functioning view places
emphasis on freedom from disease, injury, and
stress, and meeting basic requirements for life,
including appropriate nutrition, water, and so on.
Criticism of this view by adherents of other views
includes the concern that a perfectly healthy and
well-functioning animal may still be housed in an
environment providing little stimulation, hence lit-
tle opportunity for positive experiences, possibly
leading to negative affective states of boredom, frus-
tration, or depression.13
The natural living view places emphasis on the
level of “naturalness” in the lives of animals—on
the importance of natural species-specific behav-
iors and on an environment containing natural
elements.13 Some would argue that the welfare of
animals is improved the closer they are maintained
to their natural, wild state.56 Adherents of other
views criticized the natural living view based on
the fact that wild ancestors of domesticated species
may have faced difficult challenges, such as poor
nutritional or climatic conditions. There is also the
difficulty of deciding what exactly constitutes nat-
ural behaviors or environments for highly selected,
domesticated animals.
The affective states view places emphasis on the
feelings of animals.14 This view focuses on minimiz-
ing negative affect and maximizing positive affect.
This view is based on the assumption that animals
can subjectively experience their feelings, necessitat-
ing some basic form of consciousness, which is often
referred to as a sentience—the ability to experience
pain and pleasure.3,57,58
These three views of animal welfare, as with the
four notions of human quality of life, interrelate and
show some overlap.13 Many animal welfare authors
suggest that all three of these notions should be com-
bined to obtain the most accurate and complete def-
inition of animal welfare.13,59 If these three views are
combined into a unified definition of animal wel-
fare, it follows logically that they must be considered
as equally important components of animal wel-
fare. Many researchers and stakeholders, however,
will favor one of these views. Below, we compare
these three views to the notions of human quality
of life and to the different components of human
happiness.
How do the notions of animal welfare compare
to those of human quality of life?
The basic health and functioning view of animal
welfare can be related to internal chances, that is,
how well individuals are equipped to cope with
challenges (e.g., immunity and resilience). Natural
living in animals has to do with the livability of
the environment and the extent to which this is
linked to the adaptive repertoire of individuals (life-
ability). Natural living can thus be related to both
external and internal qualities of the chances axes
in the human quality of life framework (Fig. 1). The
affective states view of animal welfare is an internal
outcome, and can hence be linked to human sat-
isfaction with life or happiness. The affective states
view of animal welfare might hence be equated with,
or part of, animal happiness. To determine whether
the affective states view is animal happiness or only
part of this concept, we must first compare the three
views of animal welfare to the components of human
happiness.
The human quality of life usefulness is not rep-
resented in our selected animal welfare concepts.
However, given that animal welfare becomes a point
of concern in animals used for human benefit, and
hence with some usefulness, it seems that use-
fulness is an inherent part of all animal welfare
discussions.
How do the components of animal welfare
compare to components of human happiness?
We will now consider the three views of animal wel-
fare described above, as integrated components of a
unified animal welfare concept and compare them
to the components of human happiness, namely
the satisfaction with life view of the human qual-
ity of life. As mentioned above, human happiness
draws from two separate components: affective and
cognitive. In human happiness research, health or
(natural) living conditions are not included as com-
ponents of happiness, but rather as factors that
impact on human happiness60 or possible out-
comes/consequences of happiness.61,62 Only affect
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is included as a component of both animal welfare
and human happiness.
Vertebrate animals are sometimes accepted as
sentient beings based on evidence that they can feel
both pain and pleasure (see Ref. 5). If animals can
feel good or bad, the concept of a typical level of
affect, or the affective component of human hap-
piness, applies; even if animals are not aware of
their frequency.50 In this respect, animals might be
comparable to human infants.63 The importance
of affect to animal welfare, and in particular the
importance of the balance between positive and
negative affective experiences, is reflected in pre-
viously proposed definitions of animal welfare (see
Ref. 64 for a review of frameworks of positive ani-
mal welfare). Simonsen65 defined animal welfare as
“the animal’s positive and negative experiences.”
McMillan66 proposed that animal quality of life,
which is now roughly accepted as synonymous with
animal welfare,17 “may be viewed as a set of scales,
with pleasant feelings on one side and unpleasant
feelings on the other.”67 Yeates and Main68 proposed
that animal welfare is based on everyday sensational
pleasures, among other things. Finally, Green and
Mellor3 argued that a good animal life could be
defined as a life where “the balance of salient pos-
itive and negative experiences is strongly positive.”
Many other applied ethologists have also empha-
sized the important role of affect or affect balance in
the study of animal welfare or quality of life.6,8,48,69,70
With respect to a possible cognitive component of
animal happiness, many definitions of animal wel-
fare propose that some level of cognitive activity is
involved in the level of welfare an animal experi-
ences. Yeates and Main68 emphasize the importance
of allowing individuals to realize their own goals.
Franks and Higgins19 suggest that animal welfare is
a function of needs satisfaction and that it is based
on the ability to realize own goals, gather infor-
mation, and have some level of control over the
environment. Finally, McMillan67 writes, “Quality
of life is the affective and cognitive (to the degree
that the animal can form such a cognitive construct)
assessment that an animal makes of its life overall,”
which very closely resembles current definitions of
human happiness. Animals have goals that they are
motivated to reach, in that they are willing to work
hard to achieve them; when increasing cost is placed
on fulfilling these goals, animals will increase their
rate of work to achieve them.71 This is not only the
case for physiological necessities such as food. Ani-
mals will go a long way to defend access to aspects,
such as social contact, novelty, and occupation.72–74
Animals, moreover, display individual preferences
that are linked to liking (see Ref. 75). Animals show
indications of increased welfare when their goals are
met and preferences catered for. For instance, play
behavior is observed in juveniles of many species in
the absence of welfare threats.76 But see Ref. 77 for
a recent critical review of the link between welfare
and play.
It is, however, unclear to what extent animals are
able to conceptualize the degree to which their goals
are met and it is thus unknown whether the cog-
nitive component seen in human happiness is also
present in (certain) species of animals. We take the
tentative stance that the happiness level of (most)
vertebrate animals probably depends much more,
if not only, on the affective component of happi-
ness. This is supported by the fact that even in the
most cognitively complex species on Earth, that is
humans, the cognitive component takes a secondary
position relative to the affective component.34 Fur-
ther research will have to determine whether certain
animals can conceptualize to which degree their life
meets their standards.
Given the above reflection on how different con-
cepts of animal welfare can be related to the human
qualities of life views and human happiness com-
ponents, we define animal welfare comparably to
Fraser,13 but also similarly to human quality of life,
in terms of various views that are interrelated but
separate. The affective states view corresponds to
an internal outcome and can hence be linked to
animal happiness as far as it can be conceptualized
in a manner similar to that in humans. As with
humans, we can speculate about the environmen-
tal conditions and the individual capabilities that
make for a good life for particular kinds of ani-
mals and individuals within that species, and the
apparent importance of these will depend greatly
on the individual animal, on people’s values, and
on our current understanding of the species at that
given moment. On that basis, environmental condi-
tions and individual capabilities estimate assumed
quality of life. For example, we can ask animals to
indicate preferences for various resources, but these
preferences will depend on the options presented,
which are themselves dependent on human choices.
Moreover, we may assume that sick animals have low
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Figure 3. Linking the views of animal welfare as identified by
Fraser et al.14 with the concept of animal happiness, defined in
terms of affect balance. Natural living and biological functioning
are linked to assumed welfare, because various environmental
or psychological aspects are assumed to be better for welfare
(e.g., more natural environment or good health). Affective states
instead are linked to apparent welfare, because it is based on
assessing the subjective experience of an animal. When affective
states are investigated in the context of an individual’s life as a
whole, this view of animal welfare can be translated as animal
happiness.
levels of happiness, but this may not be the case if
the disease does not impact on the subjective experi-
ences of the animals. The only way to establish how
a particular resource or disease impacts animal hap-
piness is to study apparent quality of life and hence
attempt to assess how happy animals feel (affective
states view), and on that basis, infer in what condi-
tions they do best, rather than assume what is good
for them (Fig. 3).
Measures of affective happiness in
humans
Above, we defined affective happiness as “how well
one feels most of the time.” In humans, this can
be measured in several ways. The most common
way is to use self-reports of how well one feels gen-
erally (trait approach) or repeated self-reports of
how well one feels now (summed state approach).
How one feels generally, hence the trait approach
to affective happiness, is not the same as measuring
mood, as stated above. Self-reports are the gold stan-
dard in human happiness research. Not all humans,
however, are able to report how they feel, for
example, human infants; for these cases, several
nonverbal measures have been developed, which
focus either on typical affect level or on affect at one
given moment with the ultimate aim of computing
the ratio of pleasant and unpleasant affect, that is,
affect balance. Nonverbal indications of affect are
seen in expressive behaviors and in physiological
attendants of pleasant and unpleasant experiences.
These different approaches are introduced below
with some examples. There has been much more
research into markers of cumulative negative expe-
riences but the focus here is on measures that can go
into the positive as well as negative ranges of affec-
tive happiness. We will hence not describe in detail
measures of chronic stress or depression.
Trait approaches—estimates of typical affect
Typical affect can be assessed nonverbally using
proxy reports, which are estimates made by humans
who know an individual of interest well, such as a
parent or a friend. Such ratings draw upon both
verbal and nonverbal communications from the
individual of interest. Studies that compare sick
children or adolescent self-reports of happiness to
parent proxy reports find a gap between the
two, indicating that proxy reports, at least those
of parents, are not always accurate reports of
happiness.78,79 Behavioral measures include system-
atic observations of nonverbal behaviors deemed
indicative of a human’s typical level of affect and are
commonly made by teachers and therapists, usually
using an observation schedule such as the German
“Allensbacher Ausdrücktest,” which involves facial
expression and body posture. A study that com-
pared interviewer rating on the Allensbacher with
respondent’s self-reports found modest correlations
of around +0.40.80
Typical affect has been shown to influence human
physiology on three levels: the neuroendocrine,
immune, and cardiovascular81–84 level, thus physio-
logical response may be a valid nonverbal indicator
of the typical level of affect. For example, repeated
positive affect has been linked to lower plasma fib-
rinogen during a single stress test.82 Fibrinogen is
a positive acute phase protein, the plasma levels
of which rise in response to inflammation. Single
physiological markers, however, vary in response
to many different factors, including disease, which
makes them not entirely reliable when it comes to
assessing affective happiness. A better marker could
be a composite indicator. One example of a compos-
ite indicator of cumulative biological risk reflect-
ing complex multisystemic dysregulation is the
allostatic load (AL) model.85–87 AL increases with
accumulated stress and can be measured at a single
time point by recording the levels of a number of
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biomarkers.87 Exact biomarkers used and formula-
tions and statistical tests applied vary per study and
there is hence not one accepted method to assess
AL.87 Next to an accumulation of stress, AL was
recently also linked to an accumulation of positive
affect, and could hence be used as a physiological
indicator of typical affect.88
Another method to assess typical affect is to inves-
tigate brain structure and function. There is no sin-
gle pleasure center in the brain; instead, hedonic
valence seems to be generated by a set of limbic and
paralimbic brain structures.89,90 Major depressive
disorder, for example, is linked to changes in the size
of certain brain structures91 and Urry et al.92 found
greater left than right superior frontal activation
associated with higher levels of both affective and
cognitive components of happiness. Prefrontal acti-
vation asymmetries linked to emotions and affective
happiness are reviewed by Davidson93 and Davidson
et al.94 Affective happiness was, moreover, linked
to fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctua-
tions in the right amygdala.95 For a review on brain
changes linked to chronic stress, see Ref. 96.
At the genetic level, there is evidence that indi-
viduals with the transcriptionally more efficient
version of the serotonin transporter gene report sig-
nificantly higher levels of typical affect.97 Typical
affect is also linked to telomere length, with shorter
telomere length being associated with repeated
stress,98 and vice versa.99 Finally, gut microbiota was
linked to depression and positive mood,100 and may
hence in the future prove useful in assessing affective
happiness in humans.
Summed states approach—estimates of
affect balance
Another way to assess typical hedonic level is to use
multiple-moment observations to compute affect
balance: the ratio of pleasant to unpleasant affect.
First, one can repeatedly request self-reports of
momentary affect from individuals. This technique
is referred to as the experience sampling method
(ESM) and typically involves sending signals to indi-
viduals via their smartphones at random times of the
day, on average seven times per day for 1 week, to
ask how they are feeling in that precise moment.101
The day reconstruction method is a variant of ESM
in which respondents first list their activities of the
previous day and then rate how well they have felt
during each of these activities.102 Second, one can
sample expressive behaviors, such as laughing or
weeping, at regular time intervals; the method is
referred to as time sampling. This method has been
used to measure affect balance in human infants
using the frequency of smiling and laughing versus
crying.63 Finally, some physiological measure can
be repeatedly sampled in humans to compute affect
balance, for example, salivary cortisol82,103 or heart
rate (in men),82 with a higher frequency of positive
affect across the day being linked to lower average
cortisol and heart rate over the day.
Measures of affective happiness in animals
The study of animal affect has grown over the past
decades and we now know of several possible, more
or less validated methodologies that can be used to
assess animal affect.6,12,104,105 With animals, we lack
the gold standard of self-reports and must make
use of indirect indicators of affect instead. These
include behavioral indicators of momentary affect
(e.g., spontaneous postures and behaviors, facial
expressions, vocalizations, approach or avoidance
responses to novel stimuli), cognitive biases linked
to particular affective states (judgment, attention,
and memory), or physiological changes linked to
acute or chronic affect (e.g., oxytocin).106–110 Phys-
iological indicators of both momentary and long-
term affect include neuroendocrine,106 immune,6
and cardiovascular changes,111 as in humans. We do
not describe these behavioral, cognitive, or physio-
logical methods in detail here as these are reviewed
elsewhere.6,9,12,104,105 We do, however, point to how
these methods can be applied to our concept of
animal happiness. Moreover, as in humans, there
has been much research into markers of chronic
stress112–114 and depression115,116 in animals, usually
in laboratory animals used to study human patholo-
gies, but we once again will focus on measures that
have been found to tap into the positive range of
affective happiness.
Trait approach—estimates of typical affect
The judgment bias test (JBT) is used to assess
changes in judgment of ambiguity (optimism) in
animals.108 The theory is that cumulative experi-
ence of positive and negative affect leads to a more
or less optimistic judgment of ambiguous cues.8
If the judgment of ambiguity is based on tran-
sient mood as some suggest,117,118 then JBT does
not measure the typical level of affect and is not
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a valid method for assessing affective happiness,
unless it can be repeated in time, which has been
questioned.119 However, if JBT is measuring a sta-
ble, constant affective state instead, which is sug-
gested by studies linking it to depression,120 then
it would be a valid measure of typical affect. To
decide which of these scenarios is valid, one will
have to compare the results of the JBT with another
method that measures affect balance (see below).
JBT is associated with some practical and theoretical
limitations, as it is time-consuming, often requires
testing animals outside of their home environment,
and possibly acts as cognitive enrichment, thereby
impacting affect in itself.121–123 These limitations
require future research attention. Animal measures
of depression, such as sensitivity to reward loss, can
be used to assess the typical level of affect, although
it is unclear how far into the positive range these
measures might tap.124–127
Proxy reports of happiness have also been adapted
to certain animal species, including great apes
and felids.128–131 For example, the happiness level
of chimpanzees, including a component reflecting
affect, was rated by familiar keepers and was mod-
erately associated with objective observations of
behavior.128 Similarly, in a method called qualita-
tive behavior assessment, a subjective assessment is
used to assess the welfare state of captive and domes-
ticated animals by rating them using terms such as
positively occupied.132 Results of this approach have
been reported to show variable inter- and intra-
rater reliability.133–135 These types of proxy tools
may be criticized as being subjective and unreli-
able. Furthermore, it is unclear whether these meth-
ods assess transient emotions or moods, or affective
happiness.
Physiological correlates of affective happiness
that can be assessed at one moment in time in
humans might be applicable to animals, in partic-
ular, mammalian species—which share many brain
structures and physiological systems with humans.
Physiological markers of depression115 and chronic
stress112 in animals could provide some measure
of cumulative stress, however, as in humans, single
markers are unlikely to be reliable measures of affec-
tive happiness or even affect for that matter. Reviews
of physiological correlates of affect in animals have
previously been published.6,12 Markers of cumula-
tive stress, moreover, may fail to capture the positive
experiences and hence the positive range of affective
happiness. The concept of AL seems promising for
assessing happiness in animals (personal commu-
nication by Louise Kremer, Wageningen University
& Research, the Netherlands), and has been pre-
viously applied to defining the concept of animal
welfare.136–138 Telomere length as a measure of affec-
tive happiness in animals is very promising as it
presents a measure of cumulative stress as well as
cumulative positive experiences.139 Gut microbiota
may also offer interesting possibilities to assess typi-
cal level of affect in animals if it were to prove useful
in human happiness research.
Summed states approach—estimates of
affect balance
If current methods to assess momentary affect in
animals are valid and repeatable over a period of
time to enable a computation of the frequency
of positive and negative affect, as, for example,
with time sampling in human infants, they could
potentially be used to compute affect balance,
hence affective happiness, in animals. As men-
tioned above, methods to assess transient affect
are described in detail elsewhere and will not be
covered here. One promising behavioral indicators
of acute affect in animals is vocalization. Vocaliza-
tions in animals have been found to reflect both
affect valence (e.g., frequency and arousal) and
arousal (e.g., loudness and duration).140,141 In rats,
for example, two categories of ultrasonic vocaliza-
tions (USVs) have been linked to affect.142 Mini-
mally frequency-modulated 22-kHz USVs emitted
in putatively aversive situations have been labeled
“alarm calls” and are assumed to reflect negative
affect.143 High-frequency–modulated 50-kHz USVs
emitted during putatively positive or rewarding sit-
uations are assumed to reflect positive affect.143–145
Another example is the snorting sound produced
by horses that was recently linked to positive affec-
tive experiences.146 Many more studies have linked
vocalizations to emotions in various species. The
advantage of vocalizations is that they can be
recorded and analyzed in an automated fashion,
which may allow for long-term computations of
affect balance.
Other possible indicators of acute affect that
could be repeatedly sampled over time include
play behavior, thought to reflect positive emotion6
(although the heterogeneity of play behavior
and differences between juveniles and adults
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complicate the use of this indicator in this context,
see Ref. 77), certain body, ear, and tail postures that
can be linked to positive or negative affect,107,111,124
facial expressions,147,148 and potentially also phys-
iological markers.106 Recording these indicators of
affect repeatedly over a period of time would be
time-consuming, making those indicators that can
be sampled automatically, using, for example, sen-
sors attached to an animal’s body, very valuable in
this context.
To conclude, there has been very little work to
date done on assessing affective happiness in ani-
mals, which consequently makes our discussion of
how to measure animal happiness rather short in
comparison with the rest of this article. Instead, we
present possible avenues for future research. Work
on assessing momentary animal affect is still in its
infancy but has shown promising results, pointing
to some more or less practical and reliable behav-
ioral, cognitive, and, to a lesser extent, physiological
markers of affect. The repeated recording of these
over a set period of time presents a promising avenue
for assessing the typical level of affect in animals.
Such affect balance methods will require some level
of validation, which will be heavily dependent on
human happiness research which benefits from the
gold standard of verbal self-reports. One possibility
would be to use physiological markers of affective
happiness validated in humans to validate behav-
ioral and cognitive measures in animals though this
will require similar brain structures and physiolog-
ical systems between the animal species of interest
and humans. Once validated in some way by phys-
iology, affect balance methods can subsequently be
used as standards to identify trait approach meth-
ods, such as possibly the JBT.
One advantage of the affect balance measure-
ments is that it enables us to assess absolute pos-
itive and negative states rather than simply relative
positive and negative states.77 A negative ratio—a
higher frequency of negative over positive affect—
reflects an absolute negative state, with the number
of the ratio indicating how negative this is. A positive
ratio—a higher frequency of positive over negative
affect—reflects an absolute positive state.
Conclusions and implications
The aim of our review was to delineate a concept
of animal happiness, drawing from literature on
human quality of life and happiness and on defi-
nitions of animal welfare, and to propose possible
assessment methods. The growing public concern
for the present-day welfare of captive and domesti-
cated animals and the increasing importance of pos-
itive experiences in these concerns make this review
particularly topical.
We suggest that animal happiness is most likely
only based on an affective component of happiness,
contrary to human happiness, which draws both on
affective experience and cognitive comparison. Ani-
mal happiness, we suggest, can hence be defined as
how an animal feels most of the time. Animal hap-
piness defined in this way is about the balance of
positive and negative affect, hence reflects the view
of animal welfare commonly referred to as affec-
tive states. However, the typical level of affective
happiness cannot be equated with emotions and
moods, which represent, in most definitions, short-
term and highly variable affective states.8 Happiness
is a long-term, typically stable state, which reflects
how one feels most of the time, that is, the typi-
cal level of affect. Our review suggests that certain
notions of human happiness can be transferred to
animals, and other notions, such as the cognitive
component of human happiness, cannot, at least on
the basis of existing knowledge. We may yet find in
future research that certain animal species can con-
ceptualize to what extent their goals are met, and
hence form a cognitive appraisal of their happiness
level.
We provide here an attempt at a conceptual
framework for the understanding and study of ani-
mal happiness. Since objective measures of hap-
piness in animals have to date not received much
research attention, we advocate further research
into assessing affect balance using existing mark-
ers of acute affect in animals. We encourage further
research on affective vocalizations and the physio-
logical correlates of affect in both humans and other
animals. These could potentially provide objective
and practical (e.g., automated) assessments of ani-
mal happiness in the future. Tools to compute affect
balance in individual animals with the aim of assess-
ing animal happiness will help us understand what
animals require for a good life, in terms of both
environmental and internal qualities.
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